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Introduction
This article examines the relationship between Argentina and the Inter-
American Human Rights System (IAHRS) as it has developed over 
time. Contemporary Argentina forming part of the regional human 
rights system is clearly different from what it was in the early 1980s. 
Although several structural factors continue to shape Argentine poli-
tics, the country has broken the cycle of alternation between military 
and civilian governments and the escalation of political violence that 
characterised Argentine political history for most of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, the politics of human rights that marked the 
opposition to Argentina’s most recent military regime (1976-1983) 
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 has subsequently shaped the character of democratization since the 
transition during the government of Raúl Alfonsín. From the expressive 
and symbolic form of human rights activism that emerged during the 
period of the military regime and in the immediate transitional period, 
Argentine human rights politics has over time become increasingly 
legalized, judicialized, and transnationalized.
These patterns of evolution of human rights politics in Argentina have 
also transformed the country’s linkages with the IAHRS. Argentina has 
consistently been one of the OAS members states with the highest 
number of petitions submitted to the IACHR against it. The country 
has generated a comparatively significant number of cases because of 
a combination of factors, including the experiences of human rights 
abuses by the military regime, the work of traditional human rights 
organizations during the period of state repression, and their efforts 
to bring perpetrators to justice following the transition to democracy. 
However, the evolution of Argentine cases before the IAHRS is in many 
ways exceptional compared to those countries with similar experiences 
of human rights abuses in the region. The early cases following the 
democratic transition were predominantly related to human rights 
violations under the military regime and how the Alfonsín and Carlos 
Menem governments dealt with questions of transitional justice. These 
were followed by a number of emblematic cases relating to violations 
under the democratic regime that highlighted the structural nature 
of social violence, and the problematic character of democratization 
in Argentina. And over time, cases that involve issues of individual 
access to justice and due process have increasingly been submitted to 
the IAHRS. There is also a general development towards more indi-
vidualized treatment of cases with regards to issues that often relate 
to areas in which the public interest as interpreted by Argentine state 
institutions collide with notions of individual rights. 
Although the degree of its exceptional relationship with the IAHRS 
should not be over-stated, the case of Argentina offers important 
insights into the historical development of the regional human rights 
system as well as highlights potential future directions. Indeed, from 
fierce resistance to the IAHRS during the military regime of the 1970s 
to the supportive, embedded, and disaggregated interactions during 
much of the period since the country’s democratic transition, the 
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relationship between the IAHRS and Argentine society has become 
bound up with broader processes of democratization.2 Today, Argentina 
is one of the most denounced countries in the IAHRS. This is not due 
to more human rights violations being committed in Argentina relative 
to other countries in the region. Instead, this could be explained by the 
fact that the IAHRS —in terms of its human rights norms and insti-
tutions— is widely seen as a natural human rights mechanism when 
domestic mechanisms fail. However, as evidenced in this article, the 
path towards the more complex and multi-layered connections that 
characterise the contemporary relationship between Argentina and the 
IAHRS has been neither smooth nor inevitable. Nor have the regional 
human rights institutions operating within the traditional inter-state 
structures of the international system themselves been immune to 
change from without following its engagement with Argentina.
It is precisely because of this inherent volatility, instability and con-
tested nature of human rights politics and the ever-present risks of 
reversals of any advances made, that a longue durée perspective on the 
relationship between Argentina and the IAHRS is instructive. Indeed, 
one of the key points of this article is that the historical development 
of the relationship is crucial in order to understand the more recent 
positions of the Argentine government in the context of the IAHRS re-
form process that is the focus of this special issue. The Inter-American 
System has over time become an important actor in Argentine human 
rights politics, though its role and relative influence has evolved over 
time through a number of overlapping yet distinct stages following the 
1979 visit by the IACHR and the subsequent discrediting of the mili-
tary junta. The relationship strengthened as the Alfonsín government 
formally signed and ratified a number of international human rights 
instruments, and through the role of the IAHRS in seeking accounta-
bility for past human rights abuses in the early transitional period. It 
expanded as the IAHRS addressed authoritarian and rights-violating 
state practices in a formally democratic Argentina. And it deepened 
with the diversification of human rights activism since the mid-1990s. 
As a result of these developments, contemporary Argentina forming 
part of the regional human rights system is clearly different from the 
Argentina of the 1980s, in terms of official attitudes towards the system 
and as a result of domestic political developments in Argentina. These 
changes have combined to transform the character of the country’s 
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linkages with the system giving rise to the ‘special relationship’ that 
has developed over time. And yet, the increasing politicisation of 
human rights in Argentina in general in recent years combined with 
the Argentine government’s ambivalent positions with regards to the 
IAHRS reform process illustrate the fragility of these institutional 
developments.
This article proceeds in two main parts. The first unpacks the ways in 
which Argentina’s relationship has been shaped by domestic political 
changes, i.e. democratization. Three overlapping, yet distinct, human 
rights arenas, are examined: civil society mobilisation, constitutional 
and judicial politics, and state institutions. The second part reverses 
the analytical focus and highlights what the specific case of Argentina 
can tell us about the development of the IAHRS, and, in particular, 
emphasises the extent to which Argentina has found itself at the van-
guard of human rights struggles within and around the IAHRS. Yet, 
as this article demonstrates, Argentina’s relationship with the IAHRS 
has become increasingly strained in recent years, which demonstrates 
once more that human rights progress tends to be uneven and prone 
to reversals.
I. The IAHRS and Democratization in Argentina
The relationship between the IAHRS and Argentina is complex and 
continually evolving. Since the 1970s Argentina has been deeply en-
gaged with the IAHRS and it continues to be an important user of 
the system. Today, Argentina is one of the most denounced countries 
in the IAHRS. This pattern of recourse to regional institutions across 
countries reveals interesting points of departure. If the use of the 
regional human rights regime were primarily driven by the scale and 
severity of human rights abuses, one would not expect to see Argen-
tina as the country that consistently gives rise to some of the highest 
numbers of complaints among OAS member states. Instead, human 
rights politics in Argentina is intimately connected with the specific 
character of the country’s on-going processes of political democrati-
zation. Argentina experienced an abrupt opening up to international 
scrutiny of its domestic human rights record in the early phase of its 
democratic transition after a period of intense hostility to international 
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human rights law and institutions. The democratization of political 
contestation in Argentina opened up the country to international 
human rights influences in ways observed in few, if any, other Latin 
American countries. The IAHRS, in particular, has become increasin-
gly embedded in Argentine human rights politics, and in terms of its 
human rights standards and institutional interventions in domestic 
political affairs it is widely seen as a legitimate human rights mecha-
nism when domestic mechanisms fail.
The role and relative impact of international human rights in processes 
of democratization in Argentina has varied over time. Human rights 
emerged as a new and powerful language of political opposition to 
the military regime in the 1970s that framed understandings of the 
individual and collective consequences of the political violence of 
that period. Human rights became a political issue in part because 
of the unprecedented nature of the political repression by the mili-
tary regime, but also because of the emergence internationally of a 
new language of human rights available to oppositional actors. The 
particular constellation of political actors that successfully mobilised 
against the military regime, and the language and methods they used, 
were unprecedented, but would continue to shape Argentine political 
developments after the fall of the military regime. The discourse of 
human rights subsequently shaped the demands of accountability for 
past violations in the immediate transitional period; it underpinned 
the legitimacy of the new democratic regime as it sought to strengthen 
its position against repeated challenges to its authority by the military; 
and it motivated a range of measures aimed at state and legislative 
reforms. As the priorities of the government shifted with a new admi-
nistration towards the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 
1990s, human rights moved largely to the institutional sphere of the 
national judiciary. Following the economic crisis of 2001/2 matters of 
human rights —conceived as accountability for abuses under the mi-
litary regime— received renewed attention under the Néstor Kirchner 
administration.
Hence, human rights have consistently been a topic of public debate in 
Argentina since the democratic transition in 1983, yet the translation 
into public policy of human rights has varied over time. Moreover, 
processes of democratization in Argentina have been exposed to 
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significant, albeit uneven, transnational influences and human rights 
activism by civil society actors. As a result, the capacity of Argentine 
governments to control the human rights agenda has frequently been 
limited due to the complex interplay between the multiple actors 
that has characterized the development of human rights politics in 
Argentina.
1. The 1979 IACHR Visit and Transition to Democracy
The 1979 visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) to Argentina marks the beginning of the ‘special relationship’ 
that would develop over time between the IAHRS and Argentina.3 The 
IACHR visit for two weeks in September 1979 generated considerable 
domestic and international attention as it put the spotlight on the 
human rights record of the military regime.4 The eventual IACHR 
report on the human rights situation in Argentina was not acted upon, 
however, when presented to the OAS General Assembly in April 1980.5 
Yet, while a new US administration under Reagan and the internal po-
litics of the OAS may have prevented the condemnation of Argentina 
by its member-states, for the IACHR itself the Argentine country visit 
represents a defining moment in the development of its identity as an 
independent and operational human rights institution.6
In terms of its impact on the human rights situation in Argentina, after 
the IACHR’s visit, the number of disappearances appeared to decrease. 
But the exact cause of the military regime’s apparent cessation of the 
use of disappearances following the visit remains disputed. For Kathryn 
Sikkink the marked improvement in the human rights situation in Ar-
gentina was due to international pressures and the result of a change 
in the political climate following the IACHR visit.7 There is evidence 
to suggest however, that the military’s declared ‘war against subversion’ 
was already near completion such that by the time of the IACHR visit 
no further disappearances were deemed necessary. Indeed, in Septem-
ber 1979 the military government had claimed that it had won the war 
against the ‘subversives’. On this account, if the IACHR visit had any 
immediate effect at all it was to strengthen the position of the junta’s 
‘hardliners’ in the short term at least as they were proven right that the 
visit would backfire and generate bad publicity for the regime.
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Nonetheless, the 1979 IACHR visit constituted a turning point in the 
opposition to the military regime.8 Although Argentina at the time of 
the IACHR visit was not a signatory to any of the OAS human rights 
instruments and, moreover, the report and recommendations of the 
IACHR were strictly speaking ‘unenforceable’, the IACHR visit had a 
discernible normative impact in that it framed the political situation 
in Argentina in human rights terms and provided local actors with a 
powerful vocabulary in their political opposition against the military 
regime. In particular, the IACHR visit generated information about the 
nature and the scale of the military repression, and the report awoke 
many to a situation they had chosen to ignore.9
Ultimately, a combination of external and internal pressures led to 
the collapse of the military regime in 1983. The military defeat to the 
UK in the Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982 severely undermined the 
military’s position. The military government and its civilian allies were 
weakened by strikes prompted by the mishandling of the economy and 
denunciations of acts of corruption. Military and economic incompe-
tence are clearly important factors in explaining the military’s downfall, 
but the shift away from the general acquiescence among many sectors 
of the Argentine population over the alleged necessity for repressive 
policies to deal with ‘subversion’ is also important in explaining the 
gradual erosion of the military’s standing and support.
In particular, the IACHR’s 1979 visit firmly grounded in Argentina the 
idea of the institution as a distinct international resource for domestic 
human rights activism; it made the IACHR known to Argentinians 
more generally and enabled the wider dissemination of knowledge 
about the system; and it solidified in the country the perception of 
the IACHR as a body that would ‘tell the truth’.10 
The visit laid the foundations for future interactions between Argen-
tine human rights organizations, several generations of human rights 
lawyers and legal professionals, and future government officials on the 
one hand and the regional human rights system on the other. It is to 
the character of these interactions that has shaped the relationship 
between Argentina and the IAHRS that we now turn.
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2. Civil Society Mobilisation
In the first instance, the consolidation of the IAHRS and codification 
of an increasingly wide-ranging and ambitious set of rights provide 
important opportunities for Argentine human rights activists to pursue 
transnational advocacy strategies. The IAHRS provides opportunities 
for coalitions and alliances between on the one hand international 
and regional organizations with knowledge of the system and local 
organizations with detailed knowledge of local issues on the other. In 
these ways the availability of the IAHRS for human rights groups in 
Argentina has the potential to alter domestic political dynamics by 
strengthening the domestic position of the groups that engage with 
the system. In particular, engagement with the IAHRS enables human 
rights groups to highlight their specific demands and provide them 
with a privileged channel of access to state institutions.
In terms of concrete impact moreover, the IAHRS does not only 
monitor the Argentine state’s human rights behaviour, but it also 
forms part of negotiation strategies of civil society organizations with 
the state. The extensive experience of Argentine groups in using the 
IAHRS means that in general Argentine litigants are today among the 
best prepared in terms of having acquired an understanding of how 
the system actually works in practice. Over time significant social 
learning among Argentine human rights groups in terms of engage-
ment with the IAHRS have been accumulated. This also means that 
among Argentine civil society organisations there is a generalized and 
widespread set of attitudes that, if justice, however conceived, is not 
secured domestically, the IAHRS constitutes a realistic and legitimate 
option to pursue.
For many Argentine human rights groups the state has become the 
central focus of social movement activity and the primary referent for 
seeking change, opening public spaces of deliberation, and improving 
the ‘quality’ of democracy. Human rights groups using the IAHRS are 
increasingly linking their demands to maintaining and improving the 
capacity of state institutions to address human rights problems and 
formulate and implement appropriate public policies. Indeed, given 
the structure of the IAHRS and its institutionalized procedures of 
gaining access, the state needs to be engaged at some level. This is 
also a consequence of the changing character of the Inter-American 
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system, which has gone from being primarily concerned with ‘naming 
and shaming’ repressive military regimes in the region, to engaging 
democratic regimes through a (quasi)judicial process that assumes at 
least partially responsive state institutions.
However, there is significant variation among civil society organizations 
in their use of the system, generally across the Americas, as well as in 
the case of Argentina. The capacity of actors to mobilize the law is 
highly unequal,11 and transnational activism varies across time as well 
as between different actors. The resource-intensive process of acces-
sing the IAHRS has led to clear differentiation in the human rights 
movement with some human rights organizations, operating on the 
‘inside’, working with institutions and making use of ‘invited spaces’, 
and those groups on the ‘outside’. The differentiated engagement with 
the IAHRS by Argentine human rights organizations reflects varied 
capacities in terms of organizational structures, legal and technical 
expertise, and international connections.12
Crucially however, despite the clear differences among Argentine 
human rights groups in terms of their use of the IAHRS, there is a 
widespread sense that the IAHRS, although frequently problematic in 
practice, is fundamentally legitimate. The IAHRS serves as a resource 
for Argentine human rights groups; it shapes the discourses and prac-
tices of domestic groups; and it impacts on the relationship between 
NGOs and the state. Indeed, patterns of human rights mobilization 
in Argentina have changed significantly over time and reflect broader 
political trends and on-going processes of democratization in the 
country. In particular, the IAHRS has impacted on human rights mo-
bilization in Argentina by reinforcing the three interrelated trends of 
professionalization of human rights groups; of legalization of human 
rights demands; and of internationalization of human rights activism. 
These developments shape, in turn, the capacity of actors to mobilize 
the IAHRS and the likelihood of their success in achieving their ob-
jectives through participating in the procedures set up by the IAHRS. 
Argentine human rights organizations have developed differential links 
with the IAHRS partly as a consequence of domestic changes but also 
partly in response to the development of regional mechanisms of rights 
protection. The IAHRS privileges certain civil society actors with re-
sources, expertise, and international connections, while other groups 
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find it more difficult to gain access to the IAHRS. Still, the dense and 
varied interactions between Argentine petitioners and the IAHRS have 
led to the embedding of the regional human rights system in domestic 
political processes and the strengthening of the relationship over time.
3. Constitutional Embedding and Judicial Politics
An additional way in which the relationship between Argentina and 
the IAHRS has developed is the incorporation of the regional hu-
man rights system into Argentina’s domestic legal system and how 
these legal processes of internalization have affected political actors, 
particularly the Argentine judiciary. There are three overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing dimensions to these legal and judicial dynamics 
of the relationship and how it has consolidated over time.
First, the process by which human rights norms become constitutional 
rights is a key step towards the domestic incorporation of international 
human rights law and towards making them politically and legally 
salient at the local level. At the most fundamental level therefore, a 
country’s relationship with the IAHRS depends in large part on the 
value conferred upon them by domestic legislation. In the case of 
Argentina, the 1994 constitutional reform has ‘constitutionalized’ 
international human rights law, and the IAHRS. The constitutional 
reforms incorporated international treaties on human rights into the 
Argentine Constitution and gave some human rights treaties cons-
titutional status and others legal superiority over national laws. The 
debate regarding the legal status of international human rights law was 
essentially settled with the constitutional reforms, and an outright and 
explicit sovereigntist judicial position vis-à-vis international human 
rights law has become untenable. In particular, the constitutional re-
forms enabled an increasing interaction between the development of 
regional human rights jurisprudence and national-level constitutional 
developments in Argentina.13
The second dimension of the ways in which judicial dynamics affect 
the relationship between Argentina and the IAHRS is related to the 
country’s judicial politics and culture, broadly understood. There is 
clearly significant variation not just in the effective enforcement of 
human rights within Argentina’s domestic judicial system but also 
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in the willingness of Argentine judges to engage in the transnational 
legal culture of human rights and to take advantage of the potential 
legal and argumentative resources provided by the IAHRS. Although 
the IAHRS provides important opportunities for transnational judicial 
dialogues, these continue to be shaped by the local political context 
in which they are inextricably embedded. Many international human 
rights treaties ratified by Argentina have direct domestic effects, but 
crucial mediating factors such as judicial independence, judicial at-
titudes toward international human rights law, and the authority of 
judges and respect for the rule of law more generally deeply affect the 
domestic impact of the IAHRS; particularly within provincial judicial 
systems. The sources of this variation can be understood in terms of 
the degree of judicial independence in the first instance, but also in 
terms of the character of national legal traditions, patterns of legal 
education, and links with the transnational legal community in and 
around the regional human rights system. That is, transnational judicial 
processes are fundamentally shaped by the local political context in 
which they are inextricably embedded.
Third, the formal embedding of IAHRS norms in domestic law provides 
crucial opportunities for individuals and groups to claim, define, and 
struggle over human rights. Although far from sufficient to guarantee 
rights, the availability of litigation before domestic courts drawing 
from international human rights norms incorporated in domestic 
law is a key legitimating factor for civil society actors in their efforts 
of political and legal mobilization. Moreover, the recourse to the re-
gional human rights system formally requires the prior exhaustion of 
domestic remedies; a condition that has become particularly salient 
with the return of democracy and state institutions that are at least 
partially responsive to human rights claims. In particular, domestic 
courts have become key arenas for Argentine human rights politics as 
litigants are seeking to enforce Argentina’s international human rights 
commitments. Litigation over rights contained in international hu-
man rights instruments increases the opportunity for domestic judges 
to engage in transjudicial dialogues as cases with international legal 
components provide opportunities for judges to import international 
norms into domestic jurisprudence. But, again, whether litigation is 
an effective human rights strategy depends on how receptive judges 
are to this form of legal activism, and in turn their engagement with 
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transnational human rights. Clearly, the mere existence of legal tools 
does not mean that they can be effectively employed. A certain degree 
of legal literacy is required to engage in human rights litigation. Howe-
ver, the experiences during the military regime and the high-profile role 
the IAHRS played during this period have firmly rooted the IAHRS 
as a distinct resource and opportunity for human rights advocacy in 
Argentina. There is a significant body of human rights professionals 
that know how to use the IAHRS. Indeed, Argentina differs from 
many other countries in the region in terms of its relationship with 
the IAHRS in that it is not only professional human rights NGOs 
that are using the IAHRS. Here the impact of human rights culture is 
important, which further highlights the central role of human rights 
activists as political actors and their engagement with transnational 
legal culture and the IAHRS.
Yet, one of the most important conditions for litigation to be a po-
tentially useful strategy to enforce rights against the state is judicial 
openness. Anticipating futility, individuals or groups may decide to 
avoid courts altogether. The historic role of courts in Argentina would 
indicate such futility to Argentine litigants. However, contemporary 
patterns of the judicialization of human rights in Argentina suggest a 
more complex picture. There has been a marked change in the nature 
and character of judicial involvement in political matters since the 
1980s and ever greater recourse to courts.14 These trends add to the 
pressures on the Argentine judiciary to take a more active role in the 
formulation and implementation of public policy. In short, judicial 
processes are deeply embedded in the political context of democrati-
zation in Argentina. This puts the spotlight on state institutions and 
the ways in which the Argentine state responds to and engages with 
political and judicial demands for human rights reforms, including 
the IAHRS.
4. The Disaggregated State
The relationship between the Argentine state and the regional human 
rights system has shifted fundamentally over time. From the perspec-
tive of the IAHRS the Argentine state has gone from being a serial 
abuser of human rights to being their main guarantor. Conversely, from 
actively resisting the IAHRS the Argentine state has since the return 
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to democracy adopted a general state policy of cooperation with the 
IAHRS. In terms of state responses to the IAHRS, despite differences 
between the various governments that have ruled Argentina since the 
return to democracy, commitment to international human rights has 
consistently been viewed positively by governing elites. The Alfonsín 
government, confronted with the challenges of establishing demo-
cracy at home, used a principled foreign policy to develop support for 
democracy and human rights abroad.15 Alfonsín sought to draw on 
international norms to lock-in domestic policies, to internationally an-
chor domestic political struggles, and to ensure international pressure 
in case of threats to the democratic regime. As a concrete expression 
of this policy outlook, shortly after his election, Alfonsín ratified the 
American Convention on Human Rights, recognized the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court, and signed a number of other international 
human rights instruments.
The Menem administrations of the 1990s on the other hand were 
predominantly concerned with economic reforms, and the primary 
concern for foreign policy was the improvement in Argentina’s rela-
tions with the US; a radical departure from traditional Peronist foreign 
policy. In the first instance the alignment with the US was grounded 
in the interest of securing US support in Argentina’s negotiations 
with international creditors. But it also reflected Menem’s ambition 
for Argentina to re-insert itself into the international system. This 
policy was seen in efforts to rebalance the relationship with the US, 
but also in the normalization of diplomatic relations with the UK; 
strengthening of ties with the EU; contributions to UN peacekeeping 
missions; deepening regional integration in the Southern Cone; and 
the withdrawal from the Non-Aligned Movement. Hence, the strategy 
of professing adherence to international norms and institutions to 
signal membership of the club of ‘developed states’ and to attempt to 
‘lock-in’ domestic policy preferences displayed remarkable continuity 
with the Alfonsín administration, despite otherwise starkly dissimilar 
political ideologies, intellectual traditions, and policy priorities.16
Following the economic crisis of 2001/2 the government of Néstor 
Kirchner gave the question of domestic accountability for past human 
rights abuses a prominent position on his government agenda. In part 
the prioritisation of domestic human rights accountability under 
A Special Relationship Gone Normal? Argentina and the  
Inter-American Human Rights System, 1979-2013
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 3
8
128
Kirchner needs to be understood as part of efforts to break with the 
Menemist past, but also in terms of the precarious political circumstan-
ces in which Kirchner came to power. With a weak political mandate 
entering the presidential office Kirchner moved quickly and astutely 
to seize the opportunity to legitimize his rule through public support 
for accountability for past human rights abuses. Kirchner displayed 
a willingness to strategically push human rights in those areas where 
there were few political obstacles, such as with the military. 
There has been, in other words, a noteworthy continuity across different 
Argentine governments in the discursive commitment to human rights, 
and it has prevailed throughout various economic, social and political 
crises. As a result, the relationship with the IAHRS in particular has 
become one of the few areas of genuine and consistent state policies 
in Argentina. There has never been an open attack on the system 
(as in the cases of Peru and Venezuela for example), nor a manifest 
indifference (as in the case of the US). Despite significant and often 
dramatic shifts in other policy areas, this policy of cooperation with 
the IAHRS has been remarkably consistent over time and across diffe-
rent governments. As a result, through repeated interactions with the 
IAHRS and human rights organizations, a human rights bureaucracy 
has consolidated within state institutions in Argentina. The engage-
ment with the IAHRS is becoming increasingly diffused throughout 
the Argentine state apparatus, as seen, for example, in the involvement 
of the Ministerio Público in cases before the IAHRS in recent years. 
In the process human rights norms have become embedded in formal 
state institutions and the informal politics surrounding them.
The institutional management of IAHRS cases by different state 
entities has opened up space for dialogue and cooperation between 
different state institutions, and the increasing interaction with the 
IAHRS has strengthened the relative status of sections of the bu-
reaucracy dealing with human rights. The Argentine state no longer 
interacts with the system solely through the human rights section of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cancillería). Several distinct institu-
tional channels shape the relationship with the IAHRS, including the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministerio Público, and provincial authorities. 
These processes have also led to a discernible degree of socialization 
of state officials responsible for the formulation and implementation 
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of human rights policies. This means that when Argentine cases are 
taken up by the IAHRS, instead of “defending the indefensible”, 
Argentine officials have tended to seek to engage in a dialogue with 
petitioners in order to reach friendly settlement agreements and to 
avoid litigation. These policies have remained reasonably consistent 
despite increased interaction between Argentina and the IAHRS over 
the course of nearly three decades and a steadily increasing number 
of cases against the Argentine state before the system. 
And yet, despite a significant degree of political cooperation with 
the IAHRS since the democratic transition in Argentina the capacity 
of state institutions to ensure the implementation of human rights 
reforms is limited. It is therefore important to consider the variable 
ways in which Argentine state institutions respond to transnational 
pressures and demands channelled through the IAHRS and how these 
responses in turn shape the relationship between Argentina and the 
IAHRS. State institutions often represent the ‘black box’ of political 
analysis through which societal interests are translated into policies and 
policy outcomes. Unpacking the various ways in which the Argentine 
state responds to the IAHRS demonstrates however, the importance 
of moving beyond the unitary state to consider how various state 
institutions interact with and shape the relationship with the IAHRS.
A significant dose of realism is required nonetheless. Despite signifi-
cant advances in the relationship with the IAHRS, many challenges 
facing substantive human rights reforms in Argentina remain. Even 
in cases where political will exists to comply with the judgements and 
recommendations of the IAHRS, state institutions do not always have 
the capacity —whether managerial, administrative, technical, or hu-
man —to ensure effective implementation of human rights reforms.17 
Nonetheless, from fierce resistance to the IAHRS during the military 
regime of the 1970s, the interactions between the IAHRS and Argen-
tina have become broadly supportive, embedded, and disaggregated. 
Moreover, state compliance with the judgements and recommenda-
tions of the IAHRS increasingly involves not merely the adoption of 
remedies in individual cases but also more wide-ranging human rights 
reforms. Hence, a significant feature of the changes in the relation-
ship between Argentina and the IAHRS has been the increasing use 
of individual cases to gain momentum behind legislative and policy 
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reforms. Indeed, most domestic human rights reforms in Argentina 
can be traced back to the development of international human rights, 
particularly under the auspices of the IAHRS.
These processes have in large part been driven by efforts of human 
rights organizations to push specific human rights issues on to the 
agenda and to promote government policy changes and institutional 
initiatives. But, successful human rights activism in Argentina depends 
on locating supporters within the state bureaucracy and sustaining 
these relationships throughout the process of human rights reform. 
Yet, significant challenges related, particularly, to the administrative 
capacity of state institutions to implement and enforce human rights 
reforms remain. The fact that successive Argentine governments since 
the return to democracy have demonstrated a significant political com-
mitment towards the IAHRS, does not necessarily translate into effec-
tive implementation of the IAHRS’ decisions and recommendations.
II. Argentina and the IAHRS: A Special Relationship?
The first part of this article outlined an account of how and why the 
relationship between Argentina and the IAHRS has developed the way 
it has. Underpinning this analysis is an implicit comparative dimension 
that maintains that Argentina’s relationship with the IAHRS has been 
particularly dense and mutually reinforcing. It is precisely as a result 
of these comparatively deep and varied interactions that a ‘special 
relationship’ between Argentina and the IAHRS can be identified. 
It is important to note, however, that we can derive a more general 
understanding of the political dynamics of the IAHRS and how the 
regional system matters from the specific case of Argentina. This 
section reverses the analytical focus, therefore, to briefly outline what 
Argentina can tell us about the development of the IAHRS, and the 
extent to which Argentina has found itself at the vanguard of human 
rights struggles within and around the IAHRS. Three key features need 
highlighting: (i) the transnational dynamics of regional human rights 
politics; (ii) the changing character of the IAHRS; and (iii) the constant 
risks of reversal of any human rights progress, as demonstrated in the 
increasingly ‘normalised’ relations between the Argentine government 
and the IAHRS in recent years.
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1. Transnational Human Rights
The analysis of Argentina and the IAHRS demonstrates that the spe-
cific transnational linkages that exist between domestic actors and 
institutions and the IAHRS have given rise to a transnational political 
space in the area of human rights. In the first instance, the develop-
ment of Argentina’s engagement with the IAHRS over time, and the 
extent of the normative embedding of the IAHRS in the country’s 
constitutional order —in terms of ratification and the constitutional 
status of the IAHRS’ human rights treaties— indicate the degree of 
the transnational connections with the IAHRS. However, the political 
salience of the IAHRS does not only lie in the depth and breadth of 
its legal instruments and mechanisms, but most significantly in the 
process of internalization that link regional human rights to domestic 
political institutions and actors. The ‘menu of alternatives’ available 
to actors is amplified to the extent that they are plugged into transna-
tional networks and active participants in transnational and regional 
dialogues on matters of human rights. In particular, three interlinked 
arenas of transnational human rights that shape the relationship with 
the IAHRS can be identified: civil society mobilization, domestic courts 
and judiciaries, and state bureaucracies.
First, with regards to civil society mobilization, the IAHRS influences 
the strategies and agendas of human rights advocates. Human rights 
activists are faced with a strategic dilemma in the form of the gap that 
exists between the formal presence of human rights as embodied in 
international human rights instruments ratified by regional states and 
enshrined in the domestic legal system on the one hand, and the lived 
experiences of citizens, on the other, for many of whom these formal 
rights have little substantive meaning. Civil society mobilization as a 
force of ‘compliance’ with the IAHRS involves both a willingness to 
formulate a set of demands asserted in terms of the norms developed 
by the IAHRS and a willingness and capacity to organize to press for 
them.
The Argentine case suggests that those human rights groups that 
have adopted more professionalized organizational structures; that 
focus primarily on legal advocacy strategies; and that are plugged into 
regional support networks such as those offered by CEJIL or Human 
Rights Watch, will be more adept at benefiting from the resources and 
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opportunities provided by the IAHRS. Professional organizations and 
activists with technical expertise are therefore better positioned to 
engage with the IAHRS and state institutions. Moreover, organizations 
with a deeper level of engagement with regional and international 
networks are better equipped with information, financial resources, 
and political clout, and more extensive comparative experiences of 
campaigns and policy proposals in other countries. In this way regional 
human rights norms and institutions shape the ability of civil society 
organizations to engage in national and transnational activism and 
highlight the continuing need for these actors and organizations to 
adjust their roles and strategies to the changing national, regional and 
global political contexts.
Second, the recourse to the IAHRS formally requires the prior exhaus-
tion of domestic judicial remedies; a requirement that is particularly 
salient in relation to abusive, but formally democratic, societies and 
state institutions that are at least partially responsive to human rights 
claims. As a consequence, domestic judiciaries have emerged as im-
portant political actors within the Inter-American system. The extent 
of the judiciary’s engagement with the IAHRS and whether regional 
human rights norms and jurisprudence affect the reasoning and judicial 
decisions of courts have therefore become an increasingly significant 
dimension of how the IAHRS matters. The contrast between Argen-
tine and Brazilian judicial attitudes towards IAHRS jurisprudence, for 
example, is an important factor in explaining the relative influence 
of the IAHRS in these respective countries. Clearly political factors 
still shape the judiciaries’ use of international human rights law, as 
the Kirchner government’s pressures on the judiciary to overturn the 
‘impunity laws’ demonstrate in the case of Argentina.
Moreover, beyond questions related to the political dependence of 
judges, Latin American judiciaries have traditionally not been the most 
progressive of social institutions.18 Hence, the broader effects of Latin 
American judiciaries’ engagement with international human rights law, 
and particularly with the IAHRS, depend on litigants bringing human 
rights cases to the courts. The effective translation of IAHRS norms 
and constitutional human rights protections into practice, and more 
broadly, the use of law and courts for social change, requires the activi-
ties of lawyers and legal practitioners. This highlights the importance of 
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domestic activists bringing human rights cases before domestic courts 
and arguing their cases on the basis of IAHRS norms. Human rights 
litigation before domestic courts therefore has become an important 
mechanism for human rights activists in their efforts of activating the 
IAHRS at the domestic level and in applying regional human rights 
standards in litigation of concrete cases before domestic courts.
Third, the role of state institutions and state officials in responding to 
the judgements and recommendations of the IAHRS underlines the 
importance of institutional mechanisms for effective implementation. 
The case of Argentina highlights that the impact of the IAHRS on 
domestic public policy formulation and implementation is to a large 
extent a function of its embedment in state institutions, and whether 
the state has effectively organized its institutions in ways that provide 
effective remedies for human rights violations. Argentina also underli-
nes the potential of socialization of state officials as a consequence of 
their engagement with the IAHRS. The interaction between the IAHRS 
and sectors of the Argentine state bureaucracy has given rise to pro-
cesses of socialization on the part of state officials involved. Whatever 
their original views, engaging with the IAHRS, petitioners and domestic 
human rights groups, having to justify policy within the terms of the 
dominant discourse of the system, may foster such socialization within 
state bureaucracies. Yet, in light of the administrative frailties of many 
Latin American states, one of the key challenges lies in establishing 
administrative procedures and institutional mechanisms that ensure 
the implementation of IACHR recommendations, the sentences of the 
Inter-American Court, and that would not rely on the discretionary 
support of the executive on a case to case basis. Indeed, the IAHRS 
increasingly stresses the need to develop institutional mechanisms and 
to generate discussion of policy reforms beyond individual cases. The 
IAHRS has also developed increasingly intrusive human rights norms 
that promote standards for the organization of state institutions. In 
particular, the IAHRS provides a political space for discussion and 
negotiation between the key actors involved in human rights reforms 
(including different parts of the state); it provides an authoritative 
set of norms and standards to regulate the specific issue-area subject 
to the reforms; and it adds an additional layer of political pressure, 
momentum and urgency to the resolution of human rights problems.
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2. The Changing Character of the IAHRS
The case of Argentina also raises broader issues concerning the deve-
lopment of the IAHRS, particularly as they relate to analytical debates 
about the conceptual understandings of the impact of international 
human rights law and institutions. Three points in particular need 
highlighting.
First, the IAHRS is no longer primarily concerned with “naming and 
shaming” of repressive military regimes. It seeks rather to engage demo-
cratic regimes through a (quasi)judicial process that assumes at least 
partially responsive state institutions. This broader trend in the logic 
of state compliance with the IAHRS highlights the shifting incentives 
facing states in cooperating with the regional human rights regime. It 
also underlines, moreover, the importance for human rights scholarship 
to move beyond the unitary state to consider how various state insti-
tutions and officials interact with the IAHRS to shape human rights 
compliance. Sustained human rights activism has indeed strengthened 
processes of socialization in many Latin American states, but rule-
consistent behaviour as predicted by earlier human rights scholarship 
remains patchy at best.19 An analytical focus on the disaggregated state 
would allow a better understanding of many contemporary human 
rights violations in Latin America, and elsewhere, that are occurring 
in the context of weak and fragile states where state responsibility for 
violations is difficult to establish and often even absent. In the practice 
of the IAHRS and for many human rights activists in the region, states 
in Latin America have gone from being abusers of human rights to 
being their main guarantor.
Second, the internalization of IAHRS mechanisms and norms in 
domestic political and legal systems has significantly altered the cha-
racter of state compliance. Engagement, or non-engagement, with the 
IAHRS has traditionally been dominated by the political branches of 
government and largely controlled by the Executive and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in particular. Although these state entities remain 
crucial, a broader range of state institutions and actors are now in-
volved. Domestic court systems in particular have come to play more 
prominent roles as arenas of human rights politics, leading to increa-
singly judicialized processes of compliance. Moreover, domestic actors 
tend not to remain passive recipients of international human rights 
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norms and there are important feedback mechanisms as these actors 
influence the development of international norms and institutions.
Third, the IAHRS has become increasingly inserted into domestic 
policy and legislative debates on specific human rights issues across 
the region. This signals a gradual move away from a dominant focus 
on contentious litigation of individual cases to attempts to settle cases 
through, for example, friendly settlement procedures. This “change 
of paradigm” in human rights activism reflects the increasing use of 
individual cases to promote broader government policy changes and 
institutional changes. But it also reflects an increasing emphasis on 
enabling, as opposed to constraining, state action for the protection 
and promotion of human rights. Yet, much scholarship continues to 
adopt understandings of human rights that focus exclusively on im-
posing constraints on state behaviour. This is certainly the case with 
Beth Simmons’ landmark study of international human rights law, 
which despite its methodological sophistication considers internatio-
nal legal norms mainly to the extent that they impose constraints on 
state behaviour.20 The case of Argentina shows, however, that focusing 
exclusively on the law as a constraint misses the important constructive 
role that international human rights law has in legitimating political 
behaviour and in enabling state reforms. In order to better understand, 
therefore, the ways in which international legal norms impact on sta-
tes and societies richer understandings of the role of law in shaping 
political behaviour are required.21
3. Fragility of Progress and Risks of Reversals
Argentina has been in the vanguard of the development of the IAHRS, 
in part because of the ways in which Argentine human rights politics 
have affected the development of the IAHRS, and in part because 
leading Argentine lawyers have regularly occupied prominent positions 
within the IAHRS. Moreover, since the mid-1980s the Argentine state’s 
generally consistent policy of cooperation with the IAHRS has gene-
rated a broad sense of progress in the relationship with the regional 
human rights system. And yet, human rights politics is prone to rever-
sals. In recent years, this has been demonstrated in the politicisation 
of human rights in Argentina on the one hand, and the abandonment 
of the IAHRS in favour of short-term foreign policy interests by the 
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Argentine government in the context of the IAHRS reform process, on 
the other. Though these processes of human rights reversal are playing 
out on two distinct policy arenas —at home and abroad— they are 
nonetheless overlapping.
On the domestic front, contemporary Argentine politics has become 
centred on heated debates around the character of Kirchnerismo, 
with significant implications for the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
government’s human rights policies. Since the election of Néstor Kir-
chner in 2003, the question of accountability for past human rights 
abuses has been given a prominent position on the government agenda. 
Together with the significant weakening of the military as a political 
actor, the support of successive Kirchner governments has been crucial 
in precipitating the most recent shift in Argentina’s pathway to ac-
countability for past human rights abuses.22 Since the reopening of the 
trials for violations committed during the military regime, significant 
prosecutorial momentum has developed.23
And yet, there are noteworthy limitations on Argentina’s most re-
cent approach to its past, with important effects on contemporary 
human rights struggles, political accountability, and the relationship 
with the IAHRS. In the first instance, the politics of human rights in 
Argentina has tended to revolve around more narrow concerns about 
accountability for historically defined past abuses, rather than around 
broader accountability in Argentina’s inevitably —though not uni-
quely— flawed democracy. The intimate association in the minds of 
significant sectors of the population between human rights and abuses 
by the military regime, has limited the advocacy agenda to abuses of 
the past, whilst for many sectors of society, the widespread abuses of 
the present constitute a more pressing concern. The association of the 
vocabulary of human rights with military abuses of the past has often 
made it difficult to mobilise the human rights discourse around pres-
sing contemporary challenges. The pursuit of accountability for past 
human rights violations in Argentina continues to co-exist with very 
persistent impunity for a wide range of human rights violations; from 
rampant police violence to enduring discrimination against indigenous 
communities. There are, in other words, considerable accountability 
deficits in Argentina that are quite unrelated to the extent to which 
accountability for past human rights crimes are achieved.
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For some time it has been pointed out that the focus of successive 
Kirchner governments on the crimes of the past has allowed them to 
avoid dealing with current human rights problems. Yet, there is now a 
real risk that the politicisation of human rights discourse and practice 
in Argentina is reaching a tipping point. Numerous indicia point in this 
direction. First, the strong political association between the Madres 
and Kirchnerismo may have been mutually beneficial —in addition 
to its instrumental role in advancing the current human rights trials. 
But the moral leadership of Madres has become shrouded in doubt 
as a consequence of the controversies surrounding the Schoklender 
corruption case. Similarly, the recent appointment of Army Chief César 
Milani by the government has triggered an intense polemic over the 
General’s alleged involvement in human rights violations as a young 
officer during the military regime; a controversy that has engulfed 
CELS.24 The Cristina Fernández government is also facing increasingly 
vocal accusations of corruption, and political opponents have gained 
some leverage in their attempts to portray the trials as a partisan at-
tempt at ‘victors’ justice’. Indeed, supporters of the military regime 
have sought to appropriate the language of ‘accountability’, with the 
government as their target, to oppose the trials, and perpetrators have 
sought to portray themselves as ‘victims’ of government persecution.
This politicisation of human rights may have been inevitable. Any 
meaningful struggle for human rights is deeply politicised, and where 
consequential, likely to provoke opposition. Indeed, thirty years have 
passed since Argentina returned to democratic rule, and a consensus 
on transitional justice, and the role of human rights in Argentine de-
mocracy more broadly, remains elusive. A ‘contentious coexistence’ 
of opposing, and competing, views about the past may indeed be 
what can be reasonably wished for.25 Moreover, selective government 
support for human rights is problematic, though often predictable. 
After all, addressing the past of previous political rulers at the expense 
of the present and the future tends to be politically expedient for an 
incumbent government. Yet, the increasingly intense politicisation, and 
instrumentalisation, of human rights domestically has also impacted 
on Argentina’s relationship with the IAHRS. Successive Argentine 
governments have acknowledged special international obligations that 
limit the scope of political discretion and the autonomy of domestic 
laws in human rights matters. The government recognition of such 
A Special Relationship Gone Normal? Argentina and the  
Inter-American Human Rights System, 1979-2013
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 3
8
138
international obligations has been matched by robust diplomatic 
support to the IACHR, in particular.26 
In recent years however, the Cristina Fernández government has 
appeared to signal a reversal by failing to support the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights against retrograde attempts to restruc-
ture the regional human rights body.27 The Argentine government’s 
diplomatic support for the IAHRS started to deteriorate after the 
resignation of the Foreign Minister, and former IACHR Executive 
Secretary (1996-2001), Jorge Taiana in June 2010. Taiana’s replace-
ment, Héctor Timerman induced a further regional alignment of 
Argentina with the ALBA countries. These more general shifts within 
Argentine government’s foreign policy-making coincided with an ac-
celeration of the slow, yet continuous, decline of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) on the regional scene. The OAS has become 
increasingly marginalised from addressing the many challenges of 
human rights, insecurity, inequality, democratic rule, and economic 
development in the broader region. Clearly, the centre of gravity of 
the regional institutional landscape has shifted away from the OAS 
towards competing regional arrangements, such as UNASUR (Union 
of South American Nations), and ALBA. Many Latin American coun-
tries, including Argentina, also increasingly look beyond the region 
for diplomatic and economic cooperation (with China, India, and 
Iran, for example).
It is in this regional context of institutional flux that the Argentine 
government appears to have sacrificed support for the IAHRS in fa-
vour of other regional priorities. In particular, the ambition of both 
Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández to consolidate relations with 
the South American sub-region has led to a general recalibration of 
foreign policy priorities. This was seen in efforts to broaden Mercosur 
(to include Venezuela) as well as deepen it (beyond purely economic 
relations and towards political cooperation, including on human rights 
matters). The increasing focus on South America as a privileged are-
na for Argentine foreign policy was also reflected in the creation of 
UNASUR, with Néstor Kirchner briefly serving as the first Secretary-
General. Throughout the IAHRS reform process Argentina appeared 
more concerned with strengthening South American ties and its bila-
teral relationships with Venezuela and Ecuador than with supporting 
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the IACHR.28 In addition, the Cristina Fernández government may 
also have judged that its interests lie with Ecuador and Venezuela in 
their criticisms of the IACHR, particularly in relation to the Special 
Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression. These criticisms resonate 
with the Argentine government’s domestic efforts to push through a 
controversial media law reform and in its on-going struggles with the 
media group Clarín. The Argentine government even proposed to 
support the move of the IACHR from Washington D.C. to Buenos 
Aires in response to calls to weaken the perceived U.S. dominance of 
the Commission.29 The proposal was dropped, however, following a 
meeting between Cristina Fernández and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, 
after which the former stated its continued support for a move of 
the IACHR, but not to Buenos Aires. Similarly, in its relations with 
Brazil the Argentine government has appeared equally willing to 
down-prioritise its traditional diplomatic support for the IAHRS, as 
seen in the aftermath of the IACHR’s interim measures in April 2011 
requesting Brazil to halt the construction of the Belo Monte dam. 
The response by the Dilma Rousseff government to the IACHR was 
very swift when it decided to suspend its annual contribution to the 
human rights body. At the time, it also withdrew the former Human 
Rights minister, Paulo Vannuchi’s candidacy to become member of 
the Inter-American Commission. It appears that following a personal 
request for assistance from the Brazilian president, Cristina Fernández 
agreed to support the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the IACHR. 
The relationship between Argentina and the IAHRS, in recent years, 
appears, in other words, less and less ‘special’. That is, the main point 
here is precisely that the Argentine government in recent years has 
‘normalised’ its relationship with the IAHRS. This can be seen in 
a series of moves to balance its foreign policy priorities and in the 
process downgrade its support for the IAHRS when it has come into 
conflict with other policy objectives. The problem, for the IAHRS, 
and for Argentine society as well, is that this policy reorientation has 
coincided with the IAHRS reform process. Clearly, the IAHRS is at 
a delicate conjuncture as a result of the divergent tracks of regional 
institutionalisation referred to above. The Inter-American Commission 
in particular is facing fierce criticisms from several regionally influen-
tial countries, including Venezuela, whose government under former 
president Hugo Chávez took the step to renounce the jurisdiction of 
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the Inter-American Court. Although there has been a gradual return 
to the status quo by the Brazilian government, as reflected in the re-
cent election of Paulo Vannuchi to the Inter-American Commission, 
the very public challenge to the IACHR’s authority in the Belo Monte 
case has been damaging. Equally detrimental to the effectiveness of 
the IAHRS is the combination of indifference with which certain OAS 
governments treat the IAHRS, as evidenced in uneven ratification rates 
(the US, Canada, English-speaking Caribbean not having ratified the 
American Convention and not having accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Court), lack of adequate financial support, and patchy 
compliance rates.30
The risk of the slow death of the IAHRS by asphyxiation is real. The 
rise of sub-regional organisations in Latin America challenging the OAS 
has gained a certain momentum, and at least before the passing of 
Hugo Chávez there were determined considerations of the creation of 
human rights bodies as part of either UNASUR or CELAC. Moreover, 
with the consolidation of Mercosur’s human rights mandate, the 
IAHRS may appear less and less the ‘only game in town’ for the many 
groups and individuals seeking international redress for human rights 
abuses in Latin America. Indeed, the recent creation of the Instituto 
de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Humanos (IPPDH) by Mercosur, with 
headquarters in Buenos Aires, was strongly supported by the Argentine 
government. The IPPDH can be seen in part as an effort by Argentina 
to channel regional human rights debates away from UNASUR and 
towards its own sub-region.31 It can also be understood as a way for 
the Argentine government to try to reconcile its professed support 
for human rights with its ambition to consolidate its South American 
foreign policy priorities. It should be noted, however, that the Director 
of IPPDH, Victor Abramovich, a former Executive Director of CELS 
and IACHR Commissioner, has sought to establish a mutually bene-
ficial working relationship between Mercosur and the IAHRS/OAS in 
human rights matters. Whether Argentina’s sub-regional efforts to 
consolidate Mercosur’s human rights mandate will work in harmony 
with the IAHRS or will lead to further regional fragmentation is too 
early to tell.
And yet, for many of the supporters of the IAHRS the reform pro-
cess has proved, thus far, less monumental than initially feared. The 
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reform process was strongly dominated by governments trying to tie 
down the IACHR, in particular, and reduce its autonomy. But the 
counter-mobilisation of a regional network of human rights groups 
proved relatively effective. In the case of Argentina specifically, the 
long-standing relationship of prominent human rights organisations 
with the IAHRS, has provided an important check on government 
policies.32 But it should be noted that some Argentine human rights 
groups, including CELS, have been broadly supportive of successive 
Kirchner governments, and have developed close political relationships. 
This highlights a central advocacy dilemma for human rights groups 
in any democratic society: too close a relationship with government is 
likely to gradually undermine organisational autonomy and agendas, 
and jeopardise their independent authority to hold government to 
account; while being too far removed from government is likely to 
reduce their capacity to influence policy.
In the case of CELS, this balancing act has proved delicate in recent 
years in a domestic context of increased political polarisation on several 
key human rights struggles, from accountability for crimes committed 
during the military regime to the reform of Argentina’s media law. In 
its public declarations CELS has sought to lend its regional prestige as 
one of Latin America’s foremost human rights NGOs to support the 
IAHRS, in collaboration with several other organisations. Yet, its public 
advocacy work has appeared primarily to focus on monitoring of the 
IAHRS reform process, and making a general case for the relevance of 
the IAHRS.33 Discursively these efforts have been based, partly, on the 
IACHR’s historical record in the case of Argentina (cemented in the 
1979 visit), and, partly, in general terms, on the continuing relevance 
of a regional human rights system in problematic contemporary de-
mocratic societies in Latin America.34 Also, CELS, together with other 
human rights organisations, have not been oblivious to the shifting 
regional institutional landscape within which the IAHRS reform pro-
cess has played out. This can be seen, for example, in efforts to strike a 
balance between lamenting the decision of the Venezuelan government 
under Hugo Chávez to renounce the jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court on the one hand, and criticising the lack of ratification of the 
American Convention and the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction 
by the U.S. on the other.35
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Human rights organisations have also sought to lobby governments in 
various OAS fora. An evaluation of the effectiveness of these behind 
the scenes lobbying efforts is tricky of course, and particularly so with 
regards to the Argentine government’s positions on the IAHRS reform 
processes referred to above. This has mainly to do with the impenetra-
ble and untransparent ways in which much domestic and foreign policy 
making is generally conducted by the Cristina Fernández government; 
providing highly limited space for any external input into the policy 
process. Moreover, this also means that the state human rights bureau-
cracy, including within the Cancillería, is unlikely to have had much 
effective input to shape the government’s positions on the IAHRS 
reform process. The broader point here, however, is that no matter the 
extent and intensity of external lobbying of the Argentine government 
the IAHRS was far from being a priority on the government’s foreign 
policy agenda, especially so after the departure of Jorge Taiana. And 
no available evidence suggests that when the IAHRS reform process 
was raised in bilateral discussions, with Ecuador for example, the Ar-
gentine government prioritised the strengthening of the IAHRS over 
other policy objectives.
Nonetheless, the attempt by the Cristina Fernández government to 
adopt an ambivalent position, or, possibly, pursue realpolitik at the 
expense of the IAHRS36, was eventually met with domestic and trans-
national resistance. Indeed, regional human rights groups, including 
CELS, played a central role in shifting the debate on the IAHRS 
reform process away from a highly state-controlled political context, 
where the IAHRS had few supporters —and where a confluence of 
interests of otherwise conflicting country positions could be found (e.g. 
between Colombia and Venezuela)— towards a more pluralistic and 
open environment. Put differently, the current Argentine government 
may have been prevented from moving decisively —for short-term 
political interests— against the IAHRS because of the path-dependent 
relationship that has developed over time between Argentina and the 
regional human rights system. Moreover, this also demonstrates that 
discourses matter. Consistent and high-profile diplomatic support for 
IAHRS means that a change of course does not come without signifi-
cant reputational costs. Such costs do not make discursive and policy 
change impossible of course, but potentially prohibitively expensive 
in the absence of clearly defined mitigating benefits. True, in the end, 
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Argentine officials played a central mediating role in the negotiations 
of the OAS resolution on the IAHRS reform process adopted by the 
OAS Extraordinary General Assembly meeting in March 2013.37 Yet, 
the fragility of this institutional path dependence and embedment of 
policy discursive are evident.
Conclusion
It is the key contention of this article that an appreciation of the evo-
lution of the relationship between Argentina and the Inter-American 
Human Rights System is indispensable for our understanding of the 
current conjuncture and the role of Argentina in the IAHRS reform 
process. The specific character of political democratization in Argen-
tina has driven the increasingly diverse interactions between Argentine 
society and the regional human rights system. The unpacking of these 
interactions identified the ways in which human rights activists use the 
system; how the IAHRS has shaped patterns of human rights mobili-
zation in Argentina; and distinguished the extent to which the IAHRS 
mediates relations between human rights groups and state institutions. 
The analysis also examined the extent to which the IAHRS human 
rights norms have become part of Argentina’s domestic legal system, 
the role of national courts as distinct human rights arenas, and the 
role of Argentine judges in interpreting and activating IAHRS human 
right jurisprudence in the domestic judicial system.
Particular emphasis has also been given to the remarkably consistent 
support given to the IAHRS by successive Argentine governments. 
The variable ways in which state institutions respond to human rights 
demands, and the ways in which the state bureaucracy engages with 
the IAHRS continue to fundamentally shape the relationship bet-
ween Argentina and the regional human rights system. As a result the 
IAHRS has become deeply embedded in the human rights politics of 
Argentina. Conversely, the contributions of Argentine actors to the 
development of the IAHRS over the years have been significant.
Tracing the relationship between Argentina and the IAHRS over time 
is exactly for this reason of broader relevance. The (special) case of 
Argentina highlights the extent to which the IAHRS has evolved from 
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its institutional origins as a ‘classical’ intergovernmental regime into a 
normatively intrusive regime. An independent regional human rights 
court and an autonomous commission are regularly judging whether 
regional states are in compliance with their international human rights 
obligations. The access of individuals and regional human rights or-
ganizations to the human rights regime has strengthened over time 
as the system has become increasingly judicialized with a procedural 
focus on legal argumentation and the generation of regional human 
rights jurisprudence. The IAHRS has also exercised its jurisdiction to 
explicitly advocate the strengthening of regional democracies as the 
strongest guarantees for the protection of a wide range of human rights.
Although clear regional differences between countries persist, the 
normative and institutional evolution of the IAHRS has led to an 
increased interaction between domestic political processes, national 
legal orders and regional human rights institutions. In the process the 
IAHRS has become embedded in domestic political and legal systems, 
and is increasingly used for the implementation of regional human 
rights norms. These processes of regionalization have opened up space 
for transnational political agency, providing opportunities for domestic 
and transnational human rights actors to bring pressure for change in 
their domestic political and legal systems.
The case of Argentina also illustrates however, that human rights po-
litics is prone to reversals. This has been demonstrated in recent years 
by the Argentine government’s ambivalent and lacklustre positions in 
the context of the IAHRS reform process. And yet, though increasingly 
‘normal’ in its relationship with the IAHRS at the level of regional inter-
state diplomacy, the multiple and varied relationships between Argentine 
society and the IAHRS remain. In particular, the demand from victims, 
relatives of victims, and human rights organisations in Argentina, remains 
robust, which —after all— bodes well for the future of the IAHRS.
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The Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) has over time 
become deeply embedded in Argentine human rights politics. When 
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combined with the contributions of Argentine actors to the IAHRS’ 
institutional development a ‘special relationship’ can be distinguished 
between Argentina and the IAHRS. And yet, the Argentine 
government’s relationship with the IAHRS has become increasingly 
ambivalent in recent years, which demonstrates once more that human 
rights progress is uneven and prone to reversals.
resumen 
Una relación ya no tan especial. Argentina y el Sistema 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1979-2013
El Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (SIDH) con el 
tiempo se ha enraizado en las políticas de derechos humanos de 
Argentina. Si sumamos esto a los aportes de los actores Argentinos al 
desarrollo institucional del SIDH podríamos identificar la existencia 
de una "relación especial" entre Argentina y el SIDH. Sin embargo, 
la relación del gobierno argentino con el SIDH ha cobrado una 
creciente ambivalencia en años recientes, demostrando una vez más 
que el avance de los derechos humanos es inconsistente y propenso 
a sufrir reveses.
 
summArio 
Uma relação já não tão especial. A Argentina e o Sistema Interameri-
cano de Direitos Humanos, 1979–2013
Ao longo do tempo, o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos 
(SIDH) enraizou-se nas políticas de direitos humanos da Argentina. 
Se somarmos a isto as contribuições dos atores argentinos ao desen-
volvimento institucional do SIDH, poderíamos identificar a existência 
de uma “relação especial” entre a Argentina e o SIDH. No entanto, 
a relação do governo argentino com o SIDH adquiriu uma crescente 
ambivalência em anos recentes, demonstrando mais uma vez que o 
avanço dos direitos humanos é inconsistente e propenso a sofrer reveses.
